{
 "name": "Cloud access assessment questions",
 "edition": "2026-11-16",
 "read_date": "2026-11-16",
 "source": "https://cloudsecurityriskassessment.com/datasets/",
 "license": "CC BY 4.0",
 "cite": "Cite this line: 'Cloud Security Risk Assessment, the 40-question assessment, edition 16 Nov 2026, https://cloudsecurityriskassessment.com/methodology/'",
 "description": "The 40 questions with domain, weight, answer values, fix, effort and the control each comes from.",
 "rows": [
  {
   "id": "id-01",
   "domain": "Identities and entitlements",
   "question": "Does the root user (or Global Administrator, or Organization Admin) of every account have phishing-resistant MFA and no access keys?",
   "weight": 3,
   "answers": "Yes, in every account=1; In some accounts=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Register a hardware or passkey MFA device on every root or top administrator identity and delete any root access keys.",
   "effort": "low",
   "control": "CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark v5.0 1.4 and 1.5",
   "control_url": "https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/amazon_web_services"
  },
  {
   "id": "id-02",
   "domain": "Identities and entitlements",
   "question": "Do all people reach the cloud through central single sign-on with MFA, with no local IAM users or standalone cloud passwords?",
   "weight": 3,
   "answers": "Yes, all people use SSO with MFA=1; Mostly, with some local users=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Federate every cloud account to the central identity provider with MFA and delete or disable all local human users.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark IM-6",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-identity-management"
  },
  {
   "id": "id-03",
   "domain": "Identities and entitlements",
   "question": "Are long-lived access keys and service account keys absent, or rotated at least every 90 days and unused ones deleted?",
   "weight": 3,
   "answers": "Yes, none or all under 90 days=1; Some are older or unused=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Replace static keys with short-lived credentials, and delete every key older than 90 days or unused for 90 days.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "Google Cloud security best practices Service account keys",
   "control_url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/best-practices-for-managing-service-account-keys"
  },
  {
   "id": "id-04",
   "domain": "Identities and entitlements",
   "question": "Do workloads get cloud access through attached roles, managed identities or workload identity federation instead of stored secrets?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, for all workloads=1; For some workloads=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Move each workload to platform-issued identities and remove the stored secret it used before.",
   "effort": "high",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark IM-3",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-identity-management"
  },
  {
   "id": "id-05",
   "domain": "Identities and entitlements",
   "question": "Is the number of people with administrator-level roles small, named and separate from their daily accounts?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, small, named and separate=1; Small but not separate=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Cut administrator assignments to a named list and give each administrator a separate account for daily work.",
   "effort": "low",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark PA-1",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-privileged-access"
  },
  {
   "id": "id-06",
   "domain": "Identities and entitlements",
   "question": "Are privileged roles granted only for a limited time, on request, instead of held permanently?",
   "weight": 3,
   "answers": "Yes, for all privileged roles=1; For some privileged roles=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Make privileged roles eligible only, with an approval and a maximum duration of a few hours.",
   "effort": "high",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark PA-2",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-privileged-access"
  },
  {
   "id": "id-07",
   "domain": "Identities and entitlements",
   "question": "Are permissions reviewed at least every 90 days and unused ones removed?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, reviewed and removed=1; Reviewed, but removal is not enforced=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Schedule a quarterly review of all privileged and cross-account access and remove what was unused.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark PA-4",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-privileged-access"
  },
  {
   "id": "id-08",
   "domain": "Identities and entitlements",
   "question": "Are emergency (break-glass) accounts in place, protected, monitored and tested at least twice a year?",
   "weight": 1,
   "answers": "Yes, protected, alerted and tested=1; Exist but untested or unmonitored=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Create two emergency accounts with long unique credentials, alert on every sign-in and test them twice a year.",
   "effort": "low",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark PA-5",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-privileged-access"
  },
  {
   "id": "net-01",
   "domain": "Network reachability",
   "question": "Is every SSH, RDP and database port closed to the whole internet (0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0)?",
   "weight": 3,
   "answers": "Yes, none are open=1; Open on a few exceptions=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Remove every inbound rule from 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0 on ports 22, 3389 and database ports, and use brokered access instead.",
   "effort": "low",
   "control": "Google Cloud security best practices VPC firewall rules",
   "control_url": "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/firewalls"
  },
  {
   "id": "net-02",
   "domain": "Network reachability",
   "question": "Do your data stores and platform services (storage, databases, secrets, AI) accept traffic only through private endpoints?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, for all production services=1; For some services=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Create private endpoints for production data services and turn off their public network access.",
   "effort": "high",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark NS-2",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-network-security"
  },
  {
   "id": "net-03",
   "domain": "Network reachability",
   "question": "Do new compute instances and databases get no public IP address by default?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, enforced by policy=1; By convention, not enforced=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Enforce a policy that denies public IP assignment on compute and databases unless an approved exception exists.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark NS-1",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-network-security"
  },
  {
   "id": "net-04",
   "domain": "Network reachability",
   "question": "Do administrators reach servers through a brokered, logged service (Session Manager, Bastion, Identity-Aware Proxy) with no inbound admin ports?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, for all servers=1; For some servers=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Switch server administration to a brokered service and delete shared SSH keys and jump hosts.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark PA-6",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-privileged-access"
  },
  {
   "id": "net-05",
   "domain": "Network reachability",
   "question": "Is the instance metadata service hardened (IMDSv2 required on AWS, managed identity endpoint protected on Azure, metadata concealment on GKE)?",
   "weight": 3,
   "answers": "Yes, enforced everywhere=1; On new resources only=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Require IMDSv2 on all instances and set the account default so new instances cannot opt out.",
   "effort": "low",
   "control": "AWS documentation Instance metadata",
   "control_url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/configuring-instance-metadata-service.html"
  },
  {
   "id": "net-06",
   "domain": "Network reachability",
   "question": "Is outbound traffic from production workloads filtered to known destinations?",
   "weight": 1,
   "answers": "Yes, deny by default with an allow list=1; Partly, for some networks=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Route production egress through a firewall or proxy with a destination allow list.",
   "effort": "high",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark NS-3",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-network-security"
  },
  {
   "id": "net-07",
   "domain": "Network reachability",
   "question": "Do you analyze which resources are reachable from the internet and from other networks (peering, transit, cross-account) at least monthly?",
   "weight": 1,
   "answers": "Yes, on a schedule with owners=1; Ad hoc=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Run a path-based reachability analysis monthly and assign every internet-reachable resource an owner.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark NS-7",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-network-security"
  },
  {
   "id": "dp-01",
   "domain": "Data perimeter",
   "question": "Is public access to object storage blocked at the organization level, not just per bucket?",
   "weight": 3,
   "answers": "Yes, organization-wide=1; On most accounts or buckets=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Turn on the organization-level public access block for object storage and fix the buckets that break.",
   "effort": "low",
   "control": "AWS documentation S3 Block Public Access",
   "control_url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/access-control-block-public-access.html"
  },
  {
   "id": "dp-02",
   "domain": "Data perimeter",
   "question": "Do your resource policies and sharing rules limit access to identities in your own organization?",
   "weight": 3,
   "answers": "Yes, enforced by policy=1; In some policies only=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Add an organization-boundary condition to resource policies and a deny rule at the organization level.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "AWS documentation Data perimeter",
   "control_url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/whitepapers/latest/building-a-data-perimeter-on-aws/building-a-data-perimeter-on-aws.html"
  },
  {
   "id": "dp-03",
   "domain": "Data perimeter",
   "question": "Can your most sensitive data be read only from trusted networks or endpoints (VPC endpoints, service perimeters, private links)?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, for all sensitive data=1; For some data stores=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Add network conditions to the policies of the sensitive data stores so they answer only from approved networks.",
   "effort": "high",
   "control": "Google Cloud security best practices VPC Service Controls",
   "control_url": "https://cloud.google.com/vpc-service-controls/docs/overview"
  },
  {
   "id": "dp-04",
   "domain": "Data perimeter",
   "question": "Do you review findings about resources shared outside your organization at least weekly?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, weekly or continuous with owners=1; Occasionally=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Enable external access analysis at the organization level and route new findings to an owner with a due date.",
   "effort": "low",
   "control": "AWS documentation IAM Access Analyzer",
   "control_url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-getting-started.html"
  },
  {
   "id": "dp-05",
   "domain": "Data perimeter",
   "question": "Are sensitive data encrypted with customer-managed keys whose use is limited to named identities and services?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, for sensitive data=1; For some data=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Move sensitive data stores to customer-managed keys and restrict key use to the services and roles that need it.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark DP-5",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-data-protection"
  },
  {
   "id": "dp-06",
   "domain": "Data perimeter",
   "question": "Do you know which storage locations hold regulated or sensitive data, and is that list up to date?",
   "weight": 1,
   "answers": "Yes, scanned and tagged=1; From memory or partly=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Run sensitive data discovery on all storage and tag the locations it finds.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark DP-1",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-data-protection"
  },
  {
   "id": "dp-07",
   "domain": "Data perimeter",
   "question": "Is every third-party and cross-account role protected by an external ID or condition, with an owner and an end date?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, all have conditions, owners and dates=1; Some do=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Add an external ID or condition, an owner and an expiry date to every third-party trust, and remove those without an owner.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "AWS documentation IAM best practices",
   "control_url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html"
  },
  {
   "id": "ai-01",
   "domain": "AI workloads",
   "question": "Does each AI agent, pipeline and application have its own cloud identity, not a shared one or a person's credentials?",
   "weight": 3,
   "answers": "Yes, one identity per agent or application=1; Some share an identity=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Give every AI agent and pipeline a dedicated identity and remove the shared roles and personal tokens it used.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark AI-4",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-artificial-intelligence-security"
  },
  {
   "id": "ai-02",
   "domain": "AI workloads",
   "question": "Is the list of actions each AI agent can perform limited to what its task needs, and written down?",
   "weight": 3,
   "answers": "Yes, scoped and reviewed=1; Partly scoped=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Replace broad roles on agents with policies naming only the actions, resources and data each agent needs.",
   "effort": "high",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark AI-4",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-artificial-intelligence-security"
  },
  {
   "id": "ai-03",
   "domain": "AI workloads",
   "question": "Can only approved models and AI services be used in your accounts, enforced by policy?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, enforced by policy=1; By guidance only=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Enforce an allow list of models and AI services with organization policies.",
   "effort": "low",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark AI-1",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-artificial-intelligence-security"
  },
  {
   "id": "ai-04",
   "domain": "AI workloads",
   "question": "Is the data an AI system can read (retrieval stores, training data, tool outputs) limited to what its users may see?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, access follows the user=1; Scoped to the data store, not the user=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Make retrieval and tool calls check the end user's permissions, and split sensitive data into separate stores.",
   "effort": "high",
   "control": "Google Cloud security best practices AI and ML security",
   "control_url": "https://cloud.google.com/architecture/framework/perspectives/ai-ml/security"
  },
  {
   "id": "ai-05",
   "domain": "AI workloads",
   "question": "Do destructive or high-impact agent actions (delete, grant access, pay, send externally) need a human approval?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, enforced in the tool=1; Documented, not enforced=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Require an approval step in the tool or workflow for each destructive or high-impact action.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark AI-5",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-artificial-intelligence-security"
  },
  {
   "id": "ai-06",
   "domain": "AI workloads",
   "question": "Are model calls, tool calls and the identity behind each logged and kept?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, logged and retained=1; Partly logged=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Turn on invocation and tool-call logging for every AI service and keep it with your other audit logs.",
   "effort": "low",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark AI-6",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-artificial-intelligence-security"
  },
  {
   "id": "gd-01",
   "domain": "Guardrails and drift",
   "question": "Do organization-level policies block the riskiest actions before they happen (SCPs, Azure Policy deny effects, organization policy constraints)?",
   "weight": 3,
   "answers": "Yes, deny rules cover our top risks=1; A few deny rules=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Write deny policies for your five riskiest actions at the organization root and apply them to every account.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "AWS documentation Service control policies",
   "control_url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_scps.html"
  },
  {
   "id": "gd-02",
   "domain": "Guardrails and drift",
   "question": "Do infrastructure changes go through code review and pipelines, with console changes in production flagged?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, console writes are flagged=1; Mostly code, console not monitored=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Alert on write actions from the console in production and make the pipeline the only role that can change infrastructure.",
   "effort": "high",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark PV-1",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-posture-vulnerability-management"
  },
  {
   "id": "gd-03",
   "domain": "Guardrails and drift",
   "question": "Does a continuous check compare live configuration against your rules and report differences within a day?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, continuous with owners=1; Periodic scans=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Run a continuous compliance check against your policy set and send non-compliant results to the resource owner.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "AWS documentation AWS Config",
   "control_url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/WhatIsConfig.html"
  },
  {
   "id": "gd-04",
   "domain": "Guardrails and drift",
   "question": "Do you test a new guardrail in audit or report-only mode and see what it would block before you enforce it?",
   "weight": 1,
   "answers": "Yes, always=1; Sometimes=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Run every new deny rule in audit mode for at least one week and review what it would have blocked.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "Microsoft documentation Azure Policy",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/governance/policy/overview"
  },
  {
   "id": "gd-05",
   "domain": "Guardrails and drift",
   "question": "Does every guardrail exception have an owner, a reason and an expiry date?",
   "weight": 1,
   "answers": "Yes, tracked with expiry=1; Tracked, no expiry=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Record each exception with an owner, a reason and an end date, and remove it automatically at the end date.",
   "effort": "low",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark PV-2",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-posture-vulnerability-management"
  },
  {
   "id": "gd-06",
   "domain": "Guardrails and drift",
   "question": "Can administrators inside a workload account not turn off logging, guardrails or security services?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, protected from account admins=1; Protected for some controls=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Deny changes to logging, security services and guardrails from every identity except a dedicated security role.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark PV-2",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-posture-vulnerability-management"
  },
  {
   "id": "ev-01",
   "domain": "Evidence",
   "question": "Are control-plane audit logs on in every account, subscription and project, in every region, including data access logs for sensitive stores?",
   "weight": 3,
   "answers": "Yes, everywhere=1; In most places=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Create an organization-wide audit trail in all regions and enable data access logs for the sensitive stores.",
   "effort": "low",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark LT-3",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-logging-threat-detection"
  },
  {
   "id": "ev-02",
   "domain": "Evidence",
   "question": "Are audit logs stored in a separate, restricted account where workload administrators cannot change or delete them?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, separate and write-once=1; Separate, but not write-once=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Send logs to a dedicated security account and lock them with object lock, immutable storage or a retention lock.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark LT-5",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-logging-threat-detection"
  },
  {
   "id": "ev-03",
   "domain": "Evidence",
   "question": "Do you keep audit logs for at least 365 days, with the most recent 90 days searchable?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, 365 days or more=1; Under 365 days=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Set audit log retention to at least 365 days and test a search over the oldest month.",
   "effort": "low",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark LT-6",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-logging-threat-detection"
  },
  {
   "id": "ev-04",
   "domain": "Evidence",
   "question": "Do alerts fire, and reach a person, for root or global administrator sign-ins, policy changes, new keys and disabled logging?",
   "weight": 2,
   "answers": "Yes, all four route to on-call=1; Some are alerted=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Create alerts for those four events and send them to the on-call channel.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark LT-2",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-logging-threat-detection"
  },
  {
   "id": "ev-05",
   "domain": "Evidence",
   "question": "Within one working day, can you produce a list of who can access a given sensitive data store and how they got that access?",
   "weight": 1,
   "answers": "Yes, within a day=1; Within a few weeks=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Practice answering the question for one sensitive data store and write the steps down.",
   "effort": "medium",
   "control": "Microsoft cloud security benchmark PA-4",
   "control_url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-privileged-access"
  },
  {
   "id": "ev-06",
   "domain": "Evidence",
   "question": "Have you practiced cutting off all access of one compromised identity within one hour, and written down the steps?",
   "weight": 1,
   "answers": "Yes, in the past 12 months=1; Planned, not practiced=0.5; No or not known=0",
   "fix": "Run a revoke-everything drill for one test identity and record how long each step takes.",
   "effort": "high",
   "control": "NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 IR-4",
   "control_url": "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final"
  }
 ]
}