# The 40-question assessment: how the cloud access score is calculated

Facts read 16 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

The method: 40 questions in six domains, answers worth 1, 0.5 or 0, weights from 1 to 3, a domain score from 0 to 100 and five fixes chosen by the largest weighted gap, with ties broken by lower effort. This page shows the arithmetic, the domain weights and the sources for the controls.

Each of the 40 questions has three answers: yes in every account, in some accounts, and no or not known. They are worth 1, 0.5 and 0. A question carries a weight of 1, 2 or 3 that records how much a wrong answer moves risk. The 40 weights add up to 84 and 12 questions weigh 3.

A domain score is the sum of value times weight over the domain's questions, divided by the sum of weights, times 100. The six domains hold 8, 7, 7, 6, 6 and 6 questions. Domain weights of 25, 20, 20, 15, 10 and 10, which add up to 100, apply only to an optional overall figure. Unknown counts as no, so a missing control and an unprovable one score the same.

The five fixes are the questions with the largest weight times one minus the answer value. Ties go to the lower fix effort, rated low, medium or high, and then to question order. Every question names the control it comes from, and every question page gives a test for AWS, Azure and Google Cloud, so a score can be checked rather than trusted.

## What each answer is worth

| Question | Domain | Weight | Answers and values | Fix effort |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [1. Does the root user (or Global Administrator, or Organization Admin) of every account have phishing-resistant MFA and no access keys?](/questions/root-account-mfa/) | Identities and entitlements | 3 | Yes, in every account = 1; In some accounts = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| [2. Do all people reach the cloud through central single sign-on with MFA, with no local IAM users or standalone cloud passwords?](/questions/workforce-sso-mfa/) | Identities and entitlements | 3 | Yes, all people use SSO with MFA = 1; Mostly, with some local users = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [3. Are long-lived access keys and service account keys absent, or rotated at least every 90 days and unused ones deleted?](/questions/long-lived-keys/) | Identities and entitlements | 3 | Yes, none or all under 90 days = 1; Some are older or unused = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [4. Do workloads get cloud access through attached roles, managed identities or workload identity federation instead of stored secrets?](/questions/workload-identity/) | Identities and entitlements | 2 | Yes, for all workloads = 1; For some workloads = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| [5. Is the number of people with administrator-level roles small, named and separate from their daily accounts?](/questions/admin-roles-limited/) | Identities and entitlements | 2 | Yes, small, named and separate = 1; Small but not separate = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| [6. Are privileged roles granted only for a limited time, on request, instead of held permanently?](/questions/no-standing-privilege/) | Identities and entitlements | 3 | Yes, for all privileged roles = 1; For some privileged roles = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| [7. Are permissions reviewed at least every 90 days and unused ones removed?](/questions/access-reviews/) | Identities and entitlements | 2 | Yes, reviewed and removed = 1; Reviewed, but removal is not enforced = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [8. Are emergency (break-glass) accounts in place, protected, monitored and tested at least twice a year?](/questions/emergency-access/) | Identities and entitlements | 1 | Yes, protected, alerted and tested = 1; Exist but untested or unmonitored = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| [9. Is every SSH, RDP and database port closed to the whole internet (0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0)?](/questions/no-open-admin-ports/) | Network reachability | 3 | Yes, none are open = 1; Open on a few exceptions = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| [10. Do your data stores and platform services (storage, databases, secrets, AI) accept traffic only through private endpoints?](/questions/private-service-endpoints/) | Network reachability | 2 | Yes, for all production services = 1; For some services = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| [11. Do new compute instances and databases get no public IP address by default?](/questions/no-default-public-ip/) | Network reachability | 2 | Yes, enforced by policy = 1; By convention, not enforced = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [12. Do administrators reach servers through a brokered, logged service (Session Manager, Bastion, Identity-Aware Proxy) with no inbound admin ports?](/questions/brokered-admin-access/) | Network reachability | 2 | Yes, for all servers = 1; For some servers = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [13. Is the instance metadata service hardened (IMDSv2 required on AWS, managed identity endpoint protected on Azure, metadata concealment on GKE)?](/questions/metadata-service-hardened/) | Network reachability | 3 | Yes, enforced everywhere = 1; On new resources only = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| [14. Is outbound traffic from production workloads filtered to known destinations?](/questions/egress-controlled/) | Network reachability | 1 | Yes, deny by default with an allow list = 1; Partly, for some networks = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| [15. Do you analyze which resources are reachable from the internet and from other networks (peering, transit, cross-account) at least monthly?](/questions/reachability-analysis/) | Network reachability | 1 | Yes, on a schedule with owners = 1; Ad hoc = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [16. Is public access to object storage blocked at the organization level, not just per bucket?](/questions/public-storage-blocked/) | Data perimeter | 3 | Yes, organization-wide = 1; On most accounts or buckets = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| [17. Do your resource policies and sharing rules limit access to identities in your own organization?](/questions/organization-boundary/) | Data perimeter | 3 | Yes, enforced by policy = 1; In some policies only = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [18. Can your most sensitive data be read only from trusted networks or endpoints (VPC endpoints, service perimeters, private links)?](/questions/trusted-network-condition/) | Data perimeter | 2 | Yes, for all sensitive data = 1; For some data stores = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| [19. Do you review findings about resources shared outside your organization at least weekly?](/questions/external-access-findings/) | Data perimeter | 2 | Yes, weekly or continuous with owners = 1; Occasionally = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| [20. Are sensitive data encrypted with customer-managed keys whose use is limited to named identities and services?](/questions/key-control/) | Data perimeter | 2 | Yes, for sensitive data = 1; For some data = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [21. Do you know which storage locations hold regulated or sensitive data, and is that list up to date?](/questions/sensitive-data-located/) | Data perimeter | 1 | Yes, scanned and tagged = 1; From memory or partly = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [22. Is every third-party and cross-account role protected by an external ID or condition, with an owner and an end date?](/questions/third-party-access/) | Data perimeter | 2 | Yes, all have conditions, owners and dates = 1; Some do = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [23. Does each AI agent, pipeline and application have its own cloud identity, not a shared one or a person's credentials?](/questions/ai-own-identity/) | AI workloads | 3 | Yes, one identity per agent or application = 1; Some share an identity = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [24. Is the list of actions each AI agent can perform limited to what its task needs, and written down?](/questions/ai-tool-permissions/) | AI workloads | 3 | Yes, scoped and reviewed = 1; Partly scoped = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| [25. Can only approved models and AI services be used in your accounts, enforced by policy?](/questions/approved-models-only/) | AI workloads | 2 | Yes, enforced by policy = 1; By guidance only = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| [26. Is the data an AI system can read (retrieval stores, training data, tool outputs) limited to what its users may see?](/questions/ai-data-reach/) | AI workloads | 2 | Yes, access follows the user = 1; Scoped to the data store, not the user = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| [27. Do destructive or high-impact agent actions (delete, grant access, pay, send externally) need a human approval?](/questions/human-approval/) | AI workloads | 2 | Yes, enforced in the tool = 1; Documented, not enforced = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [28. Are model calls, tool calls and the identity behind each logged and kept?](/questions/ai-activity-logging/) | AI workloads | 2 | Yes, logged and retained = 1; Partly logged = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| [29. Do organization-level policies block the riskiest actions before they happen (SCPs, Azure Policy deny effects, organization policy constraints)?](/questions/preventive-policies/) | Guardrails and drift | 3 | Yes, deny rules cover our top risks = 1; A few deny rules = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [30. Do infrastructure changes go through code review and pipelines, with console changes in production flagged?](/questions/changes-as-code/) | Guardrails and drift | 2 | Yes, console writes are flagged = 1; Mostly code, console not monitored = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| [31. Does a continuous check compare live configuration against your rules and report differences within a day?](/questions/drift-detection/) | Guardrails and drift | 2 | Yes, continuous with owners = 1; Periodic scans = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [32. Do you test a new guardrail in audit or report-only mode and see what it would block before you enforce it?](/questions/guardrail-testing/) | Guardrails and drift | 1 | Yes, always = 1; Sometimes = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [33. Does every guardrail exception have an owner, a reason and an expiry date?](/questions/exceptions-expire/) | Guardrails and drift | 1 | Yes, tracked with expiry = 1; Tracked, no expiry = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| [34. Can administrators inside a workload account not turn off logging, guardrails or security services?](/questions/tamper-protection/) | Guardrails and drift | 2 | Yes, protected from account admins = 1; Protected for some controls = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [35. Are control-plane audit logs on in every account, subscription and project, in every region, including data access logs for sensitive stores?](/questions/audit-logs-everywhere/) | Evidence | 3 | Yes, everywhere = 1; In most places = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| [36. Are audit logs stored in a separate, restricted account where workload administrators cannot change or delete them?](/questions/logs-protected/) | Evidence | 2 | Yes, separate and write-once = 1; Separate, but not write-once = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [37. Do you keep audit logs for at least 365 days, with the most recent 90 days searchable?](/questions/log-retention/) | Evidence | 2 | Yes, 365 days or more = 1; Under 365 days = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| [38. Do alerts fire, and reach a person, for root or global administrator sign-ins, policy changes, new keys and disabled logging?](/questions/identity-alerts/) | Evidence | 2 | Yes, all four route to on-call = 1; Some are alerted = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [39. Within one working day, can you produce a list of who can access a given sensitive data store and how they got that access?](/questions/access-evidence-on-demand/) | Evidence | 1 | Yes, within a day = 1; Within a few weeks = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| [40. Have you practiced cutting off all access of one compromised identity within one hour, and written down the steps?](/questions/revocation-drill/) | Evidence | 1 | Yes, in the past 12 months = 1; Planned, not practiced = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |

## Twenty known cases

The scoring is checked against twenty cases kept in the site's tests folder, written by hand from the model above; the build fails if one gives a different answer.

Cite this line: 'Cloud Security Risk Assessment, the 40-question assessment, edition 16 Nov 2026, https://cloudsecurityriskassessment.com/methodology/'

## Related pages

- [Cloud access risk register template (XLSX)](/risk-register/)
- [30 questions about cloud access risk assessment](/faq/)
- [The 40-question assessment: the data, downloadable](/datasets/)

## Sources

- CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark v5.0 1.4 and 1.5: https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/amazon_web_services (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Microsoft cloud security benchmark IM-6: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-identity-management (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Google Cloud security best practices Service account keys: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/best-practices-for-managing-service-account-keys (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Microsoft cloud security benchmark IM-3: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-identity-management (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Microsoft cloud security benchmark PA-1: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-privileged-access (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Microsoft cloud security benchmark PA-2: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-privileged-access (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Microsoft cloud security benchmark PA-4: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-privileged-access (read 16 Nov 2026)
- Microsoft cloud security benchmark PA-5: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/benchmark/azure/mcsb-v2-privileged-access (read 16 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://cloudsecurityriskassessment.com/methodology/
