| 1. Does the root user (or Global Administrator, or Organization Admin) of every account have phishing-resistant MFA and no access keys? | Identities and entitlements | 3 | Yes, in every account = 1; In some accounts = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| 2. Do all people reach the cloud through central single sign-on with MFA, with no local IAM users or standalone cloud passwords? | Identities and entitlements | 3 | Yes, all people use SSO with MFA = 1; Mostly, with some local users = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 3. Are long-lived access keys and service account keys absent, or rotated at least every 90 days and unused ones deleted? | Identities and entitlements | 3 | Yes, none or all under 90 days = 1; Some are older or unused = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 4. Do workloads get cloud access through attached roles, managed identities or workload identity federation instead of stored secrets? | Identities and entitlements | 2 | Yes, for all workloads = 1; For some workloads = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| 5. Is the number of people with administrator-level roles small, named and separate from their daily accounts? | Identities and entitlements | 2 | Yes, small, named and separate = 1; Small but not separate = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| 6. Are privileged roles granted only for a limited time, on request, instead of held permanently? | Identities and entitlements | 3 | Yes, for all privileged roles = 1; For some privileged roles = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| 7. Are permissions reviewed at least every 90 days and unused ones removed? | Identities and entitlements | 2 | Yes, reviewed and removed = 1; Reviewed, but removal is not enforced = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 8. Are emergency (break-glass) accounts in place, protected, monitored and tested at least twice a year? | Identities and entitlements | 1 | Yes, protected, alerted and tested = 1; Exist but untested or unmonitored = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| 9. Is every SSH, RDP and database port closed to the whole internet (0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0)? | Network reachability | 3 | Yes, none are open = 1; Open on a few exceptions = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| 10. Do your data stores and platform services (storage, databases, secrets, AI) accept traffic only through private endpoints? | Network reachability | 2 | Yes, for all production services = 1; For some services = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| 11. Do new compute instances and databases get no public IP address by default? | Network reachability | 2 | Yes, enforced by policy = 1; By convention, not enforced = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 12. Do administrators reach servers through a brokered, logged service (Session Manager, Bastion, Identity-Aware Proxy) with no inbound admin ports? | Network reachability | 2 | Yes, for all servers = 1; For some servers = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 13. Is the instance metadata service hardened (IMDSv2 required on AWS, managed identity endpoint protected on Azure, metadata concealment on GKE)? | Network reachability | 3 | Yes, enforced everywhere = 1; On new resources only = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| 14. Is outbound traffic from production workloads filtered to known destinations? | Network reachability | 1 | Yes, deny by default with an allow list = 1; Partly, for some networks = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| 15. Do you analyze which resources are reachable from the internet and from other networks (peering, transit, cross-account) at least monthly? | Network reachability | 1 | Yes, on a schedule with owners = 1; Ad hoc = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 16. Is public access to object storage blocked at the organization level, not just per bucket? | Data perimeter | 3 | Yes, organization-wide = 1; On most accounts or buckets = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| 17. Do your resource policies and sharing rules limit access to identities in your own organization? | Data perimeter | 3 | Yes, enforced by policy = 1; In some policies only = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 18. Can your most sensitive data be read only from trusted networks or endpoints (VPC endpoints, service perimeters, private links)? | Data perimeter | 2 | Yes, for all sensitive data = 1; For some data stores = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| 19. Do you review findings about resources shared outside your organization at least weekly? | Data perimeter | 2 | Yes, weekly or continuous with owners = 1; Occasionally = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| 20. Are sensitive data encrypted with customer-managed keys whose use is limited to named identities and services? | Data perimeter | 2 | Yes, for sensitive data = 1; For some data = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 21. Do you know which storage locations hold regulated or sensitive data, and is that list up to date? | Data perimeter | 1 | Yes, scanned and tagged = 1; From memory or partly = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 22. Is every third-party and cross-account role protected by an external ID or condition, with an owner and an end date? | Data perimeter | 2 | Yes, all have conditions, owners and dates = 1; Some do = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 23. Does each AI agent, pipeline and application have its own cloud identity, not a shared one or a person's credentials? | AI workloads | 3 | Yes, one identity per agent or application = 1; Some share an identity = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 24. Is the list of actions each AI agent can perform limited to what its task needs, and written down? | AI workloads | 3 | Yes, scoped and reviewed = 1; Partly scoped = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| 25. Can only approved models and AI services be used in your accounts, enforced by policy? | AI workloads | 2 | Yes, enforced by policy = 1; By guidance only = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| 26. Is the data an AI system can read (retrieval stores, training data, tool outputs) limited to what its users may see? | AI workloads | 2 | Yes, access follows the user = 1; Scoped to the data store, not the user = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| 27. Do destructive or high-impact agent actions (delete, grant access, pay, send externally) need a human approval? | AI workloads | 2 | Yes, enforced in the tool = 1; Documented, not enforced = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 28. Are model calls, tool calls and the identity behind each logged and kept? | AI workloads | 2 | Yes, logged and retained = 1; Partly logged = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| 29. Do organization-level policies block the riskiest actions before they happen (SCPs, Azure Policy deny effects, organization policy constraints)? | Guardrails and drift | 3 | Yes, deny rules cover our top risks = 1; A few deny rules = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 30. Do infrastructure changes go through code review and pipelines, with console changes in production flagged? | Guardrails and drift | 2 | Yes, console writes are flagged = 1; Mostly code, console not monitored = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |
| 31. Does a continuous check compare live configuration against your rules and report differences within a day? | Guardrails and drift | 2 | Yes, continuous with owners = 1; Periodic scans = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 32. Do you test a new guardrail in audit or report-only mode and see what it would block before you enforce it? | Guardrails and drift | 1 | Yes, always = 1; Sometimes = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 33. Does every guardrail exception have an owner, a reason and an expiry date? | Guardrails and drift | 1 | Yes, tracked with expiry = 1; Tracked, no expiry = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| 34. Can administrators inside a workload account not turn off logging, guardrails or security services? | Guardrails and drift | 2 | Yes, protected from account admins = 1; Protected for some controls = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 35. Are control-plane audit logs on in every account, subscription and project, in every region, including data access logs for sensitive stores? | Evidence | 3 | Yes, everywhere = 1; In most places = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| 36. Are audit logs stored in a separate, restricted account where workload administrators cannot change or delete them? | Evidence | 2 | Yes, separate and write-once = 1; Separate, but not write-once = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 37. Do you keep audit logs for at least 365 days, with the most recent 90 days searchable? | Evidence | 2 | Yes, 365 days or more = 1; Under 365 days = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | low |
| 38. Do alerts fire, and reach a person, for root or global administrator sign-ins, policy changes, new keys and disabled logging? | Evidence | 2 | Yes, all four route to on-call = 1; Some are alerted = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 39. Within one working day, can you produce a list of who can access a given sensitive data store and how they got that access? | Evidence | 1 | Yes, within a day = 1; Within a few weeks = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | medium |
| 40. Have you practiced cutting off all access of one compromised identity within one hour, and written down the steps? | Evidence | 1 | Yes, in the past 12 months = 1; Planned, not practiced = 0.5; No or not known = 0 | high |